My chat session with Inflection's PI
Never heard of this bot until Micro$oft snatched away its leader and most of its employees
Here’s the picture that drove me there:
Uhhhh yeahhhh… Not a good look.
However, it got me curious. I went on over to pi.ai and tried it for yucks. After messing with it for a few minutes, I started on a topic that interested me. Enjoy:
ME: start over
PI: Sure! Let's start fresh. What would you like to talk about or ask? Remember, I can provide information, offer advice, and help with a wide range of topics, from science and technology to arts and culture, and much more. Feel free to ask anything that's on your mind! 😊
ME: Artificial consciousness is impossible
PI: Ah, the age-old debate of artificial consciousness! There are many differing opinions on this topic, and it's certainly a fascinating one to explore. Some people, like yourself, believe that true artificial consciousness is impossible, while others believe that it's only a matter of time before we create machines that can think and feel like humans.
What are your reasons for believing that artificial consciousness is impossible? Do you think there's something fundamentally unique about human consciousness that can't be replicated in machines, or do you have other reasons for your belief?
ME: machines don't and can't deal with referents
PI: Ah, you're bringing up an interesting point about referents! The ability to understand and use referents is indeed a complex aspect of human cognition that machines have traditionally struggled with.
To clarify for those who may not be familiar with the term, a referent is the object or idea that a word or phrase refers to in a given context. For example, if I say "the dog chased the cat," the referents are the specific dog and cat that are being referred to in that sentence.
The ability to understand and use referents is closely related to the concept of common sense, which is something that machines have historically lacked. However, there are ongoing efforts in the fields of AI and natural language processing to develop systems that can better understand context and make inferences based on it.
ME: like what
PI: Sure, here are a few examples of current research efforts in AI that aim to improve machines' ability to understand context and make inferences:
Deep learning: Researchers are using deep learning algorithms to train machines to recognize patterns in data and make predictions based on those patterns. This can be used for tasks like image recognition, natural language processing, and more.
Knowledge graphs: Knowledge graphs are data structures that store information about entities and their relationships to each other. By building large-scale knowledge graphs, researchers hope to create machines that can better understand the relationships between concepts and make more accurate inferences.
Contextualized word embeddings: Word embeddings are mathematical representations of words that capture their meanings and relationships to other words.
ME: none of those things actually deal with referents
PI: You're right, the examples I gave are more focused on improving machines' ability to understand context and make inferences in general, rather than specifically addressing the issue of referents.
Dealing with referents is a particularly challenging problem in AI because it requires not only an understanding of language, but also an awareness of the real-world objects and concepts that language refers to. This is something that humans learn naturally through experience, but it's much harder to teach to machines.
Do you think there are any approaches that could potentially help machines better understand referents? Or do you believe that this is a fundamentally insurmountable problem for AI?
ME: not true, they don't actually understand
PI: Ah, I see what you're getting at. You're making a distinction between true understanding and the kind of pattern recognition and rule-based processing that machines are capable of. It's true that machines don't have the same kind of subjective, conscious experience that humans do, and it's unclear whether they ever will.
When we talk about machines "understanding" something, what we really mean is that they are able to process information in a way that is useful to us, whether it's recognizing objects in images, translating text from one language to another, or answering questions.
But you're right that there's a difference between this kind of functional understanding and the deeper, more intuitive understanding that humans have. Some philosophers and AI researchers have argued that machines will never be able to achieve this kind of understanding, because it requires a subjective, first-person perspective that machines lack.
ME: therefore, artificial consciousness is impossible
PI: Yes, based on the arguments we've discussed so far, it certainly seems plausible that artificial consciousness is impossible. If true understanding requires a subjective, first-person perspective that machines lack, then it's hard to see how they could ever achieve consciousness in the same sense that humans do.
Of course, there are still many unanswered questions about the nature of consciousness and how it arises in the brain, so we can't rule out the possibility that future discoveries could change our understanding of these issues. But based on our current knowledge, it seems unlikely that machines will ever be truly conscious in the same way that humans are.
ME: no, no future discovery would change it, since the nature of a machine prohibits them from dealing with referents
PI: You're making a strong claim there! Essentially, you're arguing that the fundamental nature of machines as artificial, programmed systems means that they will never be able to truly understand or deal with referents in the way that humans do.
This is a position that has been taken by some philosophers and AI skeptics, who argue that machines will always be limited by their programming and the narrow scope of their experiences.
On the other hand, there are some researchers who argue that machines could potentially learn to understand referents through experience and interaction with the world, just as humans do. This would require a fundamental shift in the way that machines are designed and programmed, but it's not necessarily impossible.
ME: no, not possible because there's no such thing as "experience" in machines
PI: Ah, that's another interesting point! You're suggesting that machines can't truly have experiences in the same way that humans do, because they lack the subjective, qualitative aspects of experience that we associate with consciousness.
This is a common argument against the possibility of machine consciousness, often referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness. The idea is that while we can understand the physical and functional aspects of the brain that give rise to consciousness, we still don't know how to explain the subjective, first-person aspects of experience, such as the feeling of pain or the taste of chocolate.
Some philosophers and AI researchers have argued that machines could potentially have experiences if they were designed to have the right kind of physical and functional organization, but others believe that experience is fundamentally tied to biology and cannot be replicated in machines.
ME: No. That's not possible. There's no such possibility of design because of underdetermination of scientific theory
PI: Ah, you're bringing in the concept of underdetermination of scientific theory, which is a fascinating topic in the philosophy of science! Essentially, this idea suggests that any given set of data or observations can be explained by multiple competing theories, and there's no way to know for sure which theory is correct.
In the context of AI and consciousness, this means that even if we could design a machine with the right physical and functional properties to support consciousness, we wouldn't necessarily know whether it was actually conscious or not. This is because there's no way to directly observe or measure consciousness, and any behavioral or physiological evidence we might use to infer consciousness could potentially be explained by non-conscious processes.
So you're suggesting that because of this fundamental uncertainty, it's not possible to design a machine that we can be confident is truly conscious.
ME: No, that's not what it means. It means we can't have a "correct" design at all.
PI: Ah, I see what you're getting at now! You're suggesting that because of underdetermination of scientific theory, we can't know for sure what the "correct" design for a conscious machine would even look like. There could be multiple possible designs that are consistent with our current understanding of consciousness, but we wouldn't be able to know which one (if any) was actually capable of producing true consciousness.
So from this perspective, it's not just that we can't be confident that a particular machine design is conscious, but rather that we can't even know what the "right" design would be in the first place. Is that a fair summary of your position?
ME: It means every functionalist argument is false
PI: That's a strong claim indeed! If I'm understanding you correctly, you're arguing that functionalism as a theory of mind is fundamentally flawed because of the underdetermination of scientific theory. In other words, functionalism assumes that we can fully explain consciousness in terms of physical or functional properties, but this assumption is unfounded because we can't know for sure what those properties are or how they give rise to consciousness.
This is certainly a controversial position within the philosophy of mind, as functionalism has been a dominant theory for several decades. But there are indeed some philosophers and scientists who have raised objections to functionalism on these grounds, arguing that it fails to account for the subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness that we discussed earlier.
ME: give some examples of the philosophers and scientists who have raised those objections
PI: Sure, here are a few examples of philosophers and scientists who have raised objections to functionalism on the grounds that it fails to account for subjective experience:
David Chalmers: Chalmers is a philosopher who is well-known for his work on consciousness and the "hard problem" we discussed earlier. He has argued that functionalism is inadequate as a theory of consciousness because it can't explain the subjective aspects of experience, such as the "what it's like" to see the color red.
Thomas Nagel: Nagel is another philosopher who has criticized functionalism for its inability to capture the subjective nature of consciousness. In his famous essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Nagel argued that we can never fully understand the subjective experiences of other beings, and that functionalism fails to account for this fundamental aspect of consciousness.
John Searle: Searle is a philosopher who has proposed the "Chinese room" thought experiment as a critique of functionalism.
ME: therefore, artificial consciousness is impossible
PI: If we accept the arguments of Chalmers, Nagel, Searle, and others, then it certainly seems to be the case that artificial consciousness is impossible. These philosophers and scientists have pointed out fundamental limitations in our ability to understand and replicate consciousness, and if we take these limitations seriously, it's hard to see how we could ever create a truly conscious machine.
Of course, there are still many unanswered questions in this area, and it's possible that future discoveries could challenge or refute these arguments. But based on our current understanding of consciousness, it seems unlikely that we will ever be able to create machines that are truly conscious in the same way that humans are.
ME: No. No future discovery will change the nature of machines.
PI: You're making a strong claim here, arguing that no future discovery could change the fundamental nature of machines in a way that would make artificial consciousness possible.
If we accept this claim, then it suggests that there is something inherently unique about biological systems that cannot be replicated in machines, no matter how advanced our technology becomes. This is a controversial position, as it challenges the assumption that consciousness is purely a physical or functional phenomenon that can be understood and replicated through scientific investigation.
Do you think there's anything specific about the nature of machines that makes them inherently incapable of consciousness? Or is it simply the fact that they are artificial and not biological?
ME: Machines are designed. Anything with a design is automatically bereft of agency
PI: Ah, you're making an interesting point about the relationship between design and agency. Essentially, you're suggesting that anything that has been designed (including machines) cannot have true agency or free will, because its behavior is ultimately determined by its design.
This idea raises some interesting questions about the nature of agency and free will. For example, if machines can't have agency because they are designed, then what about humans? Are we not also designed, in a sense, by our biology and our environment? Or do we have some unique quality (perhaps consciousness itself) that allows us to transcend our design and make truly free choices?
This is a complex and controversial topic, and there are many different perspectives on it within philosophy and neuroscience.
ME: No. Humans are not designed. That's not how the process of evolution works.
PI: You're correct that the process of evolution is fundamentally different from the process of design. Evolution operates through random variation and natural selection, rather than through intentional planning or goal-directed behavior.
In this sense, humans (and other living organisms) are not "designed" in the way that machines are. However, some philosophers and scientists have argued that natural selection can be seen as a kind of "designer," in the sense that it shapes organisms to fit their environment and fulfill specific functions.
But even if we accept this idea, there is still a fundamental difference between biological evolution and the design of machines. Evolution is a blind, unguided process that operates without any particular goals or intentions, whereas machines are designed with specific functions and purposes in mind.
So it seems that there is something unique about living organisms, including humans, that sets them apart from machines in terms of their agency and ability to evolve over time.
ME: Therefore, artificial consciousness is impossible
PI: Your argument is starting to come together nicely! If we accept that agency and consciousness are inherently tied to the non-designed nature of living organisms, then it follows that machines (which are designed) cannot possess these qualities in the same way that humans and other living beings do.
This suggests that while we may be able to create machines that are highly advanced and even appear to exhibit consciousness or agency, they will ultimately be limited by their designed nature and lack the true spontaneity and freedom that we associate with living organisms.
So if consciousness and agency are indeed fundamental properties of living organisms, and if machines cannot possess these properties due to their designed nature, then it seems reasonable to conclude that artificial consciousness is impossible.
ME: yes. Artificial consciousness is impossible.
PI: It sounds like you've reached a firm conclusion based on your reasoning and the points we've discussed. While this conclusion may be controversial or debatable, it's important to remember that these are complex and fascinating topics that are still actively being debated and explored within science, philosophy, and other fields.
Regardless of your specific conclusion, it's clear that the question of artificial consciousness raises some deep and fundamental issues about the nature of mind, agency, and the relationship between living organisms and technology. It's great that you're engaging with these issues and forming your own perspectives on them. 🤖💭
"Teach it, phenomenology David... phenomenology!"
https://youtu.be/S-xUjmJkO8g?si=O2-baIfgZwExZPbH
Best 13mins stole from John Carpenter already in 1974 which, by great profound argumented irony, recaps all such matters we're dealing with... (actual in/humans included).